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Since the early Gestaltists there has been a strong interest in the question of how
problem solvers get stuck in a mental impasse. A key idea is that the repeated
activation of a successful strategy from the past results in a mental set (‘Einstellung’)
which determines and constrains the option space to solve a problem. We propose
that this phenomenon, which mostly was tested by fairly restricted experiments in the
lab, could also be applied to more complex problem constellations and naturalistic
decision making. We aim at scrutinizing and reconstructing how a mental set determines
the misinterpretation of facts in the field of political decision making and leads in
consequence to wrong expectations and an ill-defined problem representation. We will
exemplify this psychological mechanism considering a historical example, namely the
unexpected stabilization of the Franco regime at the end of World War II and its survival
thereafter. A specific focus will be drawn to the significant observation that erroneous
expectations were taken as the basis for decisions. This is congruent with the notion that
in case of discrepancy between preconceived notions and new information, the former
prevails over the new findings. Based on these findings, we suggest a theoretical model
for expectation violation in political decision making and develop novel approaches
for cognitive empirical research on the mechanisms of expectation violation and its
maintenance in political decision making processes.
Keywords: problem-solving, expectancy, expectation violation, political-decision-making, mental set
FIXATION, MENTAL SET, AND EXPECTATION
In the year 1935, 4 years before the Second World War started, Karl Duncker published his
seminal book “Zur Psychologie produktiven Denkens” (Translated to English in 1945: “On problem
solving”) (Duncker, 1935, 1945). In his book Duncker founded a theory which has been widely
influencing the research of insight problem solving until today. Insight problems are characterized
by having either no obvious or just step-wise solutions, but they have a sudden, unexpected, and
unintended character. Usually, the solution requires a re-structuring of the problem elements or
the assumptions that were imposed on the problem (Metcalfe and Wiebe, 1987; Ohlsson, 1992,
2011; Wegner, 2002; Öllinger and Knoblich, 2009). Duncker was fascinated by the question, what
factors block the problem solving process and make people blind to insightful solutions.
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In his famous candle problem he asked participants to fix
a candle on the wall – given a matchbox, a box full of tacks
and a candle. The problem proved to be extremely difficult. The
solution proceeds as follows: empty the box and fix it with the
tacks to the wall, then light the candle, put wax on the matchbox
and glue the candle onto the box. Duncker argued the problem
was difficult because participants fixated on the usual functions
of the given objects. In this case, the given box needs to be used
as a container, not as a ledge. This example demonstrates that
prior knowledge imposes constraints on the utilization of objects.
Similarly, Maier showed a few years earlier (Maier, 1931) that
participants had problems using an object (e.g., a pair of pliers)
as a weight for a pendulum.
This is part of the solution to the two-string-problem (see
Figure 1). Participants were asked to tie two strings together
which hung from the ceiling. The distance between the strings
was too far apart to catch hold of both at once. The “insightful”
solution to this problem is to use the pair of pliers as weight on
one string and to swing it like a pendulum. Thus, both ends of the
strings can be reached. Participants fixated on the usual function
of the pair of pliers. Therefore, they had difficulties to use the
objects’ weight properly.
Luchins (1942) demonstrated that fixation was not only
restricted to object properties, but could also be induced by the
repeated activation of the same successful solution procedure.
Luchins asked participants to solve various water-jug-problems.
The objective was to fill a certain amount of water into one of
three jars with different capacities. The capacities of the empty
jars in the first experiment were: A (21 units), B (127), and C
(3). The goal was to attain exactly 100 units by pouring the
water from one to another. The solution of the problem is to fill
water into B (127), then pour water from B (127) to A (21) = B
(106) and finally twice from B (106) to C (2× 3)= B (100).
Luchins provided a sequence of analogous problems which
could always be solved with exactly the same sequence. After
a sequence of similar problems, a test problem was presented,
which could be solved either by the usual sequence or in a
much easier way [e.g., A(23), B(49), and C(3) goal state was
20]. The easy solution is to pour water from A to C. Almost
two thirds of the participants who were trained with the difficult
strategy were blind to the easy solution. They were caught in
a mental set. Luchins also showed that even in the case of a
problem which obviously could not be solved by the learned
procedure, participants tried the usual strategy and re-applied
it subsequently when a new problem was presented. It seemed
FIGURE 1 | Maier’s two-string problem. Left: Initial state. Right: Goal state.
fairly difficult to overcome the mental set and the associated
expectations.
Lovett and Anderson (1996) proposed a computational model
for mental set. It demonstrated that by increasing the weight of
a procedure after each successful attempt the probability of its
application will increase.
Öllinger et al. (2008) combined the concept of mental set
with the domain of insight problem solving. They demonstrated
that telling participants an insightful solution to a problem
and repeating the same solution strategy several times inhibited
the likelihood that participants applied a standard solution to
problems – even if they did not require any insightful problem
solving. As a result, this means insight blocked well-known prior
knowledge strategies.
To conclude, we propose that fixation and mental set induce
rigid behavior – firstly by exploiting prior knowledge and
secondly by procedural and working memory activation. It
seems conceivable to assume that both mechanisms influence the
problem solvers’ expectation. Fixation constrains the expectation
about the utilization of an object. Mental set creates an
expectation about the most promising and efficient strategy. By
failures, expectations are violated and participants get stuck in an
impasse or reluctantly repeat the wrong solution approach (Smith
and Blankenship, 1989, 1991; Fedor et al., 2015; Öllinger et al.,
2016).
Carnevale and Probst (1998) investigated the question what
kind of mental sets were introduced by either social conflicts
or social cooperation. In a first experimental group, they
induced a conflict by giving the information that others will
compete in a negotiation situation. In the second group,
participants were informed that others want to cooperate
with them. After mental sets were induced, the participants
were asked to individually solve Duncker’s candle problem.
It turned out that participants in the conflict situation
were significantly less likely to find the creative solution
(empty the box and use it as a platform) than in the
cooperation set. The authors emphasized that considering a
situation as a conflict “promotes a freezing of knowledge” (p.
1301).
Bar-Tal et al. (1989) suggested that changing expectations
could help to resolve a conflict mental set and convey it to a
cooperation set. The authors stated that a social conflict is a
cognitive schema. The schema is associated with knowledge and
implications emanated by core beliefs.
Kruglanski (2013) postulated two processes. The first is the
generation phase, which generates cognitive content. The second
is the cognition validation phase, where a degree of confidence is
mapped to the generated content. The first phase is crucial for
potential mental set in our framework, since it selectively sets
its focus on selected and biased pieces of information. In the
second phase, persons test the generated information with stored
evidence, whether the information is logically consistent or not.
Bar-Tal et al. (1989) detailed on potential processes which
influence the generation process. They argued that parties have
a need for closure, which means to stick to certain beliefs or
maintain a particular belief as true and reject contrary ideas or
alternative perspectives. To resolve a conflict, it is necessary to
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alternate the cognitive schema. The expectation that a conflict will
continue will not change the accessibility of the conflict schema.
For our line of argumentation this means that the violation
of expectations will activate the conflict schema. The repeated
activation of this mismatch will strengthen the conflict and at
the same time strengthen the core believe that there is only one
solution to the given problem – the person gets stuck in a mental
impasse.
To sum up, there is evidence that decision making
processes are negatively influenced by the repeated activation
of an apparently successful solution strategy or apparently
related information. Furthermore, successful strategies appear to
increase the likelihood for a premature closure making blind
for alternative solution approaches. Regarding political decision
making, this may imply that political actors can find themselves
in a conflict mode which prevents creative thinking necessary to
solve a difficult problem.
In the following, we aim at contextualizing historically
documented facts based on a comprehensive archival
research (see Collado Seidel, 2016) with the purpose of
demonstrating the relevance of mental sets in the domain of
political decision making. We will exemplify this psychological
mechanism considering the unexpected stabilization of the
Franco regime at the end of World War II and after. Based
on cognitive models, we aim to explain the persistence
of a contradiction between expectations on the one hand
and the rational perception of given facts pointing in the
opposite direction on the other hand. A specific focus will
be drawn to the significant observation that erroneous
expectations were taken as the basis for decisions, showing
that in case of discrepancy between preconceived notions
and new information the former prevail over the new
findings.
FRANCO AND THE EXPECTED
POST-WAR ORDER: RECONSTRUCTION
OF EXPECTATION VIOLATION IN A
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The Franco regime was considered an intrinsic part of the fascist
European order during World War II (see Bowen, 2000; Collado
Seidel, 2001, 2005, 2012). This circumstance was clearly perceived
by the British and Americans. As a striking example, in 1940
the British ambassador to Madrid, Sir Samuel Hoare, wrote to a
member of the Cabinet: “I have never seen so complete a control
of the means of communication, press, propaganda, aviation, etc.,
as the Germans have here. Indeed, I go so far as to say that
the Embassy and I are only existing here on German sufferance”
(Hoare, 1946, p. 32).
Therefore, American and especially British political observers
and decision makers, who had the leading role in the definition
of Allied politics toward Spain, expected that with the crushing
of German Nazism and Italian fascism, the Spanish dictator
would inevitably fall as well. A radical change, hopefully by
democratic forces, was expected and the conviction persisted that
this outcome was merely a matter of time and the “problem
Franco” would solve itself.
This conviction was consequently expressed by diplomats and
politicians involved and was shared at the top level of the British
and American governments as well (Hull et al., 1943; Hollis,
1944). It can be illustrated with one of Hoare’s vivid appraisals,
dated June 1943: “The Spanish tide is, in fact, running in our
favor and, this being so, I should let it take its own course, and
not attempt to force its pace. [...] It will, in my considered view,
collapse all the sooner if we leave it to the Spaniards themselves
to give it the coup de grâce. [...] The evidences available in Spain
go to show that it will be a monarchist restoration, and that
the restoration will be attempted between now and the end of
the year” (Hoare, 1943). Oliver Harvey, the Principal Private
Secretary to the British Foreign Secretary, put it straight shortly
thereafter with his remark: “Damn Franco! We’ll have him off his
perch before we are done” (Harvey, 1943).
Remarkably, this wrong expectation was maintained despite
the perception that Franco was even strengthening his power
within Spain. Psychologically, one may assume that the
responsible decision makers suffered from a pronounced mental
set which drove their judgment.
EXPECTATION: THE FRANCO REGIME
WILL NOT SURVIVE WORLD WORD II
The expectation of the Allied that the Franco Regime would
not survive World War II was based on three mutually related
assumptions:
(1) If the fascist reference system (Axis Powers) collapses,
Spain will be destabilized.
(2) The opposition in Spain will exploit the weakness of the
Franco regime and will establish a new regime along democratic
structures; otherwise, revolutionary events will force the issue.
(3) The Spaniards are eager to get rid of Franco.
In anticipation of the results: All of these expectations were
proven wrong and in the end the Franco regime proved stable
and kept control until 1977, when a new democratic constitution
was worked out and the first free elections were held in Spain.
In the last stages of World War II, however, the British and
American governments started from the premise that Franco’s
Spain would not survive the collapse of the Axis Powers.
Furthermore, observers – such as the British ambassador – were
convinced that the dissatisfaction with the regime was growing
continuously in all sectors of Spanish society. Ambassador Hoare
professed moreover his belief that the vast majority of Spaniards,
even the working class, favored the restoration of the Monarchy
(Hoare and Greville, 1942; Hoare, 1944).
The American ambassador to Spain, Carlton Hayes, basically
shared this view, though he, as the Americans in general,
favored the establishment of a Republic. Furthermore, though
he had serious doubts whether the Spaniards really preferred the
Monarchy being restored, he firmly shared the conviction that the
vast majority of Spaniards detested the Falange and that Franco
would leave power either voluntarily or forcibly, giving way to a
new regime (Hayes, 1944). In case of Franco’s refusal to permit a
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political transition or to introduce radical changes in the structure
of his regime, the political observers expressed their conviction
that the dictator would be forced to leave power, as ambassador
Hayes put it in May 1943: “If Franco gets rid of the Falange in time
(which I imagine he won’t), he may be able to lead an evolution
toward a more liberal government and to retain a place in it.
Otherwise, he will be forcefully ousted along with the Falange”
(Hayes, 1943).
The expectation of a sudden breakdown of the Franco regime
became even more intense and bordered on certainty after the
dismissal of the fascist dictator Mussolini in July 1943: Observers
like Alan Hillgarth, the key person of British intelligence services
in Spain, or George Kennan, special envoy of the US-State
Department, were persuaded that the Italian events would shortly
find a repetition in Spain (Hillgarth, 1943; Kennan, 1943).
In sum, there existed no doubts that Franco’s end was at
hand. The British and Americans maintained this conviction as
shown exemplarily in a dispatch from the US-ambassador, dated
September 1944: “The régime, as it is, can hardly survive the final
outcome of the war. In a Europe, and a world, then turning more
and more ‘leftward,’ Spain could not remain apart and insulated
from such a universal current” (Hayes, 1944).
Contrary to these expectations, however, neither the
destitution of Mussolini in July 1943 nor the landings of the
Allied Forces in Normandy in June 1944, and not even the
collapse of Nazism in May 1945 shook the Spanish regime.
Nevertheless, the Western Allies perseverated on their view, as
a British diplomat put it in October 1945, though in a somehow
exasperated way in the face of the past experiences: “Franco’s
down-fall is only a matter of time, whether weeks, or months
or years” (Garran, 1945b). Realizing that the expected changes
did not occur, the political analysts seemed stunned and helpless
and got stuck in an impasse: “There is a Spanish political reality
entirely apart from the general European situation, i.e., Franco
needs not fall with Hitler though undoubtedly Franco will fall if
he does not change in time” (Bonsal, 1944).
PERCEPTIONS RUNNING CONTRARY
TO THE EXPECTATIONS
This conviction professed by the British and Americans is
especially surprising due to the circumstance that the same
political observers perceived the weakness and disunity of the
oppositional forces to compel a change and on the contrary, the
political system showed no signs of weakening. The monarchists
as the most promising group just launched weak attempts by
presenting writings in which they urged in favor of the restoration
of the Monarchy. In addition, they were profoundly divided
in view of the pursued aims after the downfall of Franco.
This was understood very clearly: “The strong sectionalism
and individualism within Spain appear to foster sectional and
individual political aims which transcend national political aims,
with consequent lack of any unifying national program or
organization for the opposition as a whole or even for any
considerable part of it” (Hayes, 1944). The same basic problem
was seen in the case of the republican movement, whose only
common factor was to overthrow the existing regime. Even the
communist guerrilla, as the best organized opposition group,
showed itself unable to force a shift and to provoke a general
uprising, as demonstrated by the failure of the incursion of some
thousand guerrilla fighters in the Pyrenees in autumn 1944.
In view of these developments, as early as February 1944,
the British general staff reached the conclusion that no existing
political or military group was in a position to oust Franco
(Joint Planning Staff, 1944). Half a year later, a British political
analyst summarized the situation in Spain in the same way
by stating: “Contrary to normal expectations General Franco’s
position is undoubtedly stronger in Spain today than it had
been at any time during the past few years” (Roberts, 1944).
Even after the Hitler regime collapsed, Franco showed no
tendency to change his politics. He had apparently even
consolidated his position, as assessed by a British diplomat:
“Franco is at present more firmly established in power than
ever, in spite of the defeat of his fellow dictators” (Garran,
1945a).
Besides the observation that the opposition was deeply
divided, British and American analysts realized quite early the
presumably most ponderous reason for the hesitant attitude of
the Monarchists as the most promising opposition group: the
fears of provoking a communist revolution and the return of
uncontrolled violence and chaos in case of a sudden political
change and in particular by destabilizing the system in trying
to overthrow Franco forcibly. The profiteers of the outcome
of the Spanish Civil War did not want to endanger their
own privileged economic and social position for the sake of
bringing back the King. In the end, they felt quite comfortable
with the prevailing situation. Thus, Hoare remarked with an
amazed undertone he had “never known so many professed
monarchists who didn’t really want a king” (quoted in Hayes,
1946, p. 269).
Furthermore, the Allied perceived that Franco not only
presented himself as the sole person able to prevent the country
from plunging into chaos and anarchy. As stated by British
diplomats, in view of the ostracism practiced by the British
and American governments the dictator managed to present the
criticism against his regime and his person as an attack on the
Spanish nation, achieving broad public support (see Portero,
1989, p. 217; Collado Seidel, 2015, pp. 178f.).
DECISION MAKERS IN CONFLICT
The fear of provoking a renewed civil war hindered not only
the Monarchists in their attempts to overthrow the Franco
regime. The Allied, and especially the British policy makers
as spokesmen of the common politics toward Spain, were as
well discouraged from pursuing a more straightforward policy
accompanied by the imposition of effective economic sanctions
such as an oil-embargo for the same reason. Churchill put it
straight by remarking toward a more receptive Foreign Secretary:
“What you are proposing to do is little less than stirring up a
revolution in Spain. You begin with oil: you will quickly end in
blood” (Churchill, 1944b).
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But it was not just the memory of the atrocious civil war,
which hindered the enforcement of a rather stiff attitude toward
Franco. Above all, Churchill had in mind the Soviet Union and
its alleged interests in provoking a revolution and a communist
takeover on the Iberian Peninsula in mind. The chaotic and
troublesome situation in Europe after the war led Churchill
to avoid the embarkment toward new political adventures
(Churchill, 1944a).
WRONG ASSUMPTIONS AND
MISPERCEPTIONS
Our historical analysis allows us to assess the information
disregarded by the Allied political decision makers, which
prevented them to build up a proper representation of the
problem. We reconstruct the facts that were available but were
not integrated in a proper problem representation.
First, the assumption that the successful elimination of
Hitler’s Nazism and Mussolini’s fascism would result in the
downfall of the Franco regime, due to the consideration that it
constituted an intrinsic part of the fascist European order, was
the main misconception and led to dramatic misjudgements.
Not least, the political actors were influenced by the events
which led to the destitution of Mussolini. This resulted in a “sit
and wait” attitude in the expectation that the problem solves
itself.
Second, it was overestimated that the Spanish monarchical
and republican opposition would exploit the doom of fascism
bundling their forces with the aim of overturning the regime. On
the contrary, the opposition was weak and disunited.
Third, while it can certainly be assessed that the dictator and
the dictatorship were by no means popular, it proved wrong
that the Spaniards were eager to get rid of the regime. This
was not just the case in view of the monarchical opposition,
which preferred not to run risks, which could endanger their
own privileged position, but also for the vast majority of the
population who was afraid of chaos and a renewed civil war,
as shown by the lack of support the activities of the guerrilla
received.
Furthermore, the British and American decision makers were
trapped in a conflict mode regarding the putative reactions of the
Soviet Union as a competing player: the risk of a revolutionary
insurrection and a renewed civil war, which could lead to
negative consequences for themselves, resulted in a narrow-
minded assessment of the situation that impeded considering
alternative procedures as postulated by Carnevale and Probst
(1998).
To sum up: British and American observers and decision
makers gained and discussed the information which proved the
basic assumption of an imminent end of the Franco dictatorship
wrong. Despite seriously analyzing the information, they adhered
firmly to their original considerations. The search for alternatives
may further have been hindered by a conflict mode resulting
from the perception of the Soviet Union as a competing player.
As a result, the political key players were stuck in an impasse,
which they were unable to solve, and which contributed, in a
historical perspective and against all expectations, to the outcome
of the survival of the Franco regime after World War II until
1977.
ANALOGIES BETWEEN IMPASSE IN
PROBLEM SOLVING AND HISTORICAL
DEADLOCKS
This article follows the credo of the famous Gestaltist and social
psychologist Kurt Lewin, stating that “there is nothing as practical
as a good theory” (Tolman, 1996, p. 31). We now aim at bridging
the gap between basic research on problem solving and the
complex and applied historical situation presented above.
Expectations in problem solving, as described above,
are driven either by prior knowledge or the repeated
activation of a successful solution procedure (Lovett and
Anderson, 1996; Ohlsson, 2011). Recently, Öllinger et al.
(2016) demonstrated that even the repeated activation of
an inappropriate solution strategy led to fixation on this
strategy, although participants received consequent negative
feedback.
The reason might be that within the ill-defined search
space there were no other possibilities. This could nicely be
demonstrated by the Nine-Dot problem (see Figure 2). The
task is to connect the given nine dots by four straight and
connected lines. It is not allowed to lift the pencil or to
retrace a line (Maier, 1930; Scheerer, 1963). The problem
proved to be extremely difficult and reluctant to clues or
hints (Lung and Dominowski, 1985; Chronicle et al., 2001).
Even when people were told that the solution implies to draw
lines outside the given nine dots, most of the participants
failed (Weisberg and Alba, 1981). Indeed, the majority of
the naïve participants tried to solve the problem within the
boundaries of the given nine dots. Öllinger et al. (2014)
suggested that the Nine-Dot problem requires not only to relax
the constraint, but also to have an appropriate strategy that
helps to restrict the new and even larger search space, since
drawing lines to non-dot points increases the search space
exponentially.
FIGURE 2 | Left: The constrained Nine-Dot problem. Right: A possible
solution of the problem. In the beginning the Nine-Dot problem seems very
simple and straightforward. Initially, problem solvers expect that the given nine
dots need to be connected by dot-to-dot connecting lines and the
self-imposed assumption that lines should stay within the boundaries of the
given nine dots.
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FIGURE 3 | Left: Over-constrained problem representation. Arrows indicate a positive influence. Right: Actual problem representation.
In analogy to our historical problem constellation, it seems
conceivable that political leaders selected strategies from a
too narrow and constrained problem space (see Figure 3).
The solution seemed obvious and was only a matter of time.
The historical documents provide unequivocal evidence that
political observers persisted on their assessments although
the actual development was fairly different. Retrospectively,
these misjudgements seem inexplicable, because most facts
were already available from the beginning and were perceived
accordingly. Considering these facts would have resulted in a
more reliable expectation. This line of argumentation builds on
the work of Klein (1999, 2008), who provided a model on natural
decision making. Klein introduced a step-wise model which
relies on a recognition-primed decision process. Initially, experts
utilize familiar and already approved solution strategies. In more
detail, incidents activate prior knowledge and decision makers
evaluate, whether they already met such a situation. If so, they
execute the according actions. Depending on how complicated
the current incident is, further steps (mental simulations and
evaluation) are necessary, until an appropriate solution strategy
is selected.
Tetlock (1996, 1999) showed that providing counterfactual
facts to experts about historical events leads to clearly biased
problem representations. The representations were determined
by the decision makers’ attitudes. The results revealed that experts
neutralize dissonant data and preserve confidence in their prior
assessments by resorting to a complex battery of belief-system
defense. Tetlock showed that the results of what-if constructions
are determined by the persons’ ideological world view. He argues
that experts confronted with counterfactual evidences attempt to
reduce the cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962) by ignoring or
biasing the given evidences.
We suggest that our approach goes beyond a recognition
account. We identified mental set as a driving force for ill-
defined and biased problem representations that mainly drives
the selection of decision making strategies.
A PRELIMINARY MODEL ON POLITICAL
DECISION MAKING BASED ON INSIGHT
PROBLEM SOLVING
In this section we outline a model on political decision making,
which is based on cognitive processes stemming from the domain
of insight problem solving.
As Figure 4 depicts, experts in the field acquired a large
corpus of domain related knowledge by their profession.
However, this profound knowledge is affected by attitudes,
interests, school of thoughts, prior experience, current political
tendencies, the contemporary discourse, political systems, and
general political opinions (Tetlock, 1996, 1999). The application
of the biased knowledge to a new political situation or an
unknown counterfactual scenario (Bar-Tal et al., 1989; Tetlock,
1999) may result in a mental set which over-constrains
the search space. As a result, familiar and well-known, but
insufficient strategies are applied. Unfortunately, those strategies
will not necessarily solve the problem (Öllinger et al., 2014).
We assume that political experts have high confidence in
the reliability and validity of their knowledge. Consequently,
they will probably repeatedly activate the maladaptive solution
strategy and see no need to change the solution process. This
behavior will induce a mental set. The mental set prevents the
decision makers’ realization of expectation violation. Without
the realization there is no drive to re-structure the self-
imposed constrains. Realizing the violation of expectation
will lead to a revised decision making process which relaxes
the self-imposed constrains. As a result, the search space
for a solution will be extended and a potential solution is
accessible.
On a behavioral level, we assume that mental set is detectable
by the used words (Cohn et al., 2004; Chung and Pennebaker,
2007; Pennebaker et al., 2015) (see our suggestions in the next
section), the solution attempts, the thinking styles and the stream
of the evaluative process.
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FIGURE 4 | Model of expectation violation in political decision making. Expertise creates expectations, which result in a constrained search space. If the solution (S)
lies outside the constrained search space, maladaptive solution strategies will occur. The realization of expectation violation is the key ingredient to change the
solution strategy. Behaviorally, mental set manifests by the word use, the type of solution attempts, thinking styles, and evaluative processes.
TESTABILITY OF OUR ASSUMPTION
To convey our case study and our model proposal into a testable
research program, we derived the following hypotheses.
Word Count Analysis of the Diplomatic
Documentation
We aim at analyzing the large documentary evidence, on which
our study is based, by means of quantitative methods. Pennebaker
et al. (2001, 2003), Tausczik and Pennebaker (2010), and
Pennebaker (2011) analyzed the frequency of words and made
predictions about personality and thinking styles (e.g., function
words or the frequency of used pronouns). We postulate that
the documented assessments of Western politicians will show
similar linguistic structures. This would demonstrate that an
ideological mental set determines the search space for potential
solutions to the discussed problems in Spain. According to Klein’s
(2008) interpretation (see above), the situation was recognized
as familiar and consequently, familiar solution strategies were
applied.
Field Studies
We plan to address the question how expertise and training in
a particular political or historical domain (see Tetlock, 1999)
will influence the decision making process. We are following
Klein’s naturalistic decision making account (Klein, 1999, 2008)
and plan to test experts from the field. We propose to confront
them with fictive and complex historical and political scenarios,
which the experts should evaluate. Then the experts will be
asked to make predictions about the future developments of the
scenarios. We hypothesize that the evaluation process will rather
be determined by the specific expertise of the decision maker
than by motivational factors like reducing cognitive dissonance
(Tetlock, 1996).
Laboratory Studies
Very recently, Salvi et al. (2016) demonstrated at a behavioral
level that liberals solved problems significantly more often with
insight than conservative people. The authors argue that both
groups have different cognitive styles. In general, liberals are
more flexible whereas conservatives are more rigid and prefer
clear answers. Therefore, conservatives solve problems more
analytically and in a step-by-step manner, whereas liberals solve
the problems non-step-wise by insight.
Wiley (1998) showed that baseball experts, who were asked to
use words from their domain knowledge in an unusually context,
revealed a significant mental set. The mental set prevents the
solution of problems, which refers to the domain of expertise, but
was used in a more remote context.
Taking the evidences from both studies, we propose to test
historical and political experts with problems that either require
domain related knowledge or not. We suggest that expertise will
inhibit innovative solutions, when decision makers are asked to
find unusual solutions.
Moreover, it would be helpful to split the participants into
two extreme groups. The criterion would be the participants’
cognitive styles. This would allow investigating the interaction
between expertise and cognitive style and its impact on the
solution of insight and non-insight problem solving as well as on
political decision making.
CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
We demonstrated that insight problems violate the expectations
of problem solvers by self-imposed constraints and mental set.
We extrapolated these findings to more complex problems
such as political decision making processes. By analyzing the
considerations about Franco’s Spain we showed that in fact
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 October 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1761
fpsyg-08-01761 October 12, 2017 Time: 15:24 # 8
Öllinger et al. Expectation Violation and Problem Solving
decision makers’ limited presuppositions biased the search
space which consequently led to inappropriate expectations.
Interestingly, the biased representation was not even updated
although there was evidence which contradicted the initial
expectations.
Given these findings, we conclude that expectation violation
could be viewed as a general process that plays an eminent
role even for complex problem solving. In our understanding
both insight problem solving and political decision making could
benefit from a better understanding and a more thorough and
detailed analysis of expectations. A potential indication follows
directly from this conclusion. We suggest that it might be
worthwhile to monitor the problem solving process in order
to detect the violation of expectation. The feedback of such a
monitoring process might help the problem solvers to update,
to elaborate or to restructure the search space and the related
expectations.
Based on these findings we suggest further research in a
twofold direction: on the one side, it would be helpful to enhance
the described analogies between a determined historical setting
and the psychological models by means of analyzing further
unexpected historical developments, which led to the emergence
of problems in view of a correct political perception of the
events. This will provide the data base for attaining verifiable
conclusions. On the other side, problem solving strategies in
a political context should also be followed up in experimental
studies. For example, it would be interesting to disentangle
the different brain areas involved in the persistence of political
expectations when the truth of these expectations is challenged
by contradictory knowledge or experience.
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